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This Essay will critique the use of the term "discrimination" to de-
scribe and name the practices and harms of racial subordination. It
is part of a larger project critically examining the linguistic premises
and assumptions in legal discourse. It is important to examine lan-
guage structure and word choices in court opinions because the way
in which we discuss legal issues can deeply affect the substantive de-
velopment of legal doctrine. For example, this Essay will show how
the use of the term "discrimination" in the equal protection school
desegregation cases helped to shape and influence the doctrinal de-
bate over the proper remedy for racial segregation in public schools.
In short, this Essay seeks to develop a critical linguistic analysis of
law because language matters. Language matters because language is
about power; whoever controls the linguistic terms of the debate also
controls and frames the debate according to terms more favorable to
his or her substantive position. Language also matters because lan-
guage is related to our perceptions of social reality.' We understand
and comprehend the world through words. Thus, if we use ineffec-
tive, misleading, partial, and uninformed language to make sense of
social reality, our sense of social reality will accordingly be ineffective,
misleading, partial, and uninformed.
This Essay consists of three parts. Part I will briefly discuss and
elaborate on critical linguistic analysis and methodology, and discuss
its application to the analysis of law. Part II will examine the role that
language has played in shaping substantive legal doctrine by focusing
on the use of the term "discrimination" in equal protection law. Spe-
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cifically, it will focus on the language in the two Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation decisions ("Brown f' and "Brown If). In Brown ,2 the Supreme
Court struck down state-imposed racial segregation in public schools,
declaring that racial segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause.
In Brown I, 3 the case known as the implementation decision, the
Court issued its opinion regarding the appropriate remedy for the
constitutional violation it had found in Brown I. Curiously, in discuss-
ing the nature of the remedy, the Court in Brown II never once men-
tioned the word "segregation" in the text of its brief opinion. In-
stead, the Court discussed the harms of racial segregation and the
appropriate remedy for racial segregation using the word "discrimi-
nation" and its variations. Part II will argue that the Court made a de-
liberate decision to change the nature of the harm described in
Brown I from segregation to discrimination, and will then explore the
implications and the consequences of that linguistic shift.
Part III will examine the equal protection doctrinal implications
of the linguistic shift, and will also examine the role that language
and language structure have played in shaping the evolution of equal
protection doctrine.
I. CONSTRUCTING A CRITICAL LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY: THE MAIN
PREMISES OF A CRITICAL LINGUISTIC THEORY OF LAW
Linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf developed the theory of "metalin-
guistics" to describe a loosely defined field of linguistics concerned
with the relationship between language, thought, and the social con-
struction of reality.4 The fundamental premise underlying a metalin-
guistic approach to the study of language is that "the structure of a
human being's language influences the manner in which he under-
stands reality and behaves with respect to it.' '5 Metalinguistics studies
how language patterns structure and direct our attention to selective
portions of our environment, and how we react to those selected por-
tions of our environment.6
Language structure reflects and embodies a view of the world and
the nature of reality. 7 Therefore, changing or transforming the struc-
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4 See WHORF, supra note 1, at 23-24 (outlining the aims of operational philosophy).
5 Id. at 23.
See ANATOL RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE AND
ACTION 235 (1953) (stating that metalinguistics deals with those aspects of language that reflect
a certain worldview).
7 See, e.g., RICHARD BANDLER &JOHN GRINDER, THE STRUCTURE OF MAGIC: A BOOK ABOUT
LANGUAGE AND THERAPY 21-22 (1975) (stating that humans use language to represent and
model experience); WENDELLJOHNSON, PEOPLE IN QUANDARIES: THE SEMANTICS OF PERSONAL
ADJUSTMENT 112-42 (1946) (noting that "[ t ] he relationship between language and reality is a
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ture of languae also means changing or transforming the underlying
view of reality. The English language structure embodies and repro-
duces an Aristotelian essentialist understanding of reality,9 which is.... 10
the view that things possess an essential or ultimate nature.
Essentialism is a static view of reality and the world." If a thing has
an essence or a property by virtue of its essential nature, then under
an essentialist view, that thing will always possess that particular prop-
erty or essence. 2 On the other hand, an anti-essentialist approach to
language takes a process-oriented approach to understanding real-
ity. It presumes that there is no "objective or essential" reality as is
presumed under an Aristotelian essentialism; instead, it contends that
"reality" is socially constructed through an interaction between sub-
ject and object. 4  This approach to language presumes that words
and categories are not "objective," but rather, are subjective, cultur-
ally contingent constructs that reflect, shape, and direct our focus
and attention. 5
There are several key premises to a metalinguistic analysis of lan-
guage and law. One premise is the principle of non-identity, which
can be summed up in the statement, "A is not A."' 6 In other words,
the premise of non-identity states that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between a word and the object that is represented by that word,
and that there is a fundamental difference between similar words or
statements stated at different levels of abstraction." For example,
with respect to the difference between a word and its object, we
clearly understand that the word "hamburger" is something entirely
different from the object "hamburger."'" Thus, we do not eat a menu
structural relationship"). See generally S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 156
(4th ed. 1978) ("But as we know from everyday experience, learning language is not simply a
matter of learning words; it is a matter of correctly relating our words to the things and happen-
ings for which they stand.").
8 See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 28 (stating that taking account of differences can modify
one's beliefs).
9 See id. at 7 (noting the tremendous influence of Aristotle on modern understanding).
10 See id. at 6-10 (discussing Aristotle's generalizations on language and how they have been
distorted by later scholars).
11 See id. at 83 (noting that a basic feature of prescientific orientation is the "fundamental
notion of the static character of reality").
12 Id. at 121-22 (noting that under a certain view of language, an object possesses the quali-
ties attributed to it).
13 See id. at 83 (identifying a basic feature of scientific orientation as the "fundamental no-
tion of the process characteristic of reality").
14 See id. at 144-45 (discussing the notion that the universe is a "joint phenomenon of the
observer and the observed").
15 See id. (stating that abstraction is a personal and projective process).
16 Id. at 171.
17 See id. at 177 (stating that a word is not the same as an object, and an inference is not the
same as a description).
18 Id.
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
with the word hamburger printed on it because we know that it would
not be the same thing as actually taking a bite of a hamburger.'
A second premise is that there is a fundamental difference be-
tween words and statements at different levels of abstraction.2 0 AS
Wendell Johnson notes:
[T]ruth is not truth (A is not A), for example, in the sense that what
truth refers to on one level of abstraction is not identical with that to
which it refers on some other level. To put it in homely terms, a theo-
retical statement about hamburger is not the same as the label hamburger,
which in turn is not the same as hamburger you can stick a fork into and
put in your mouth, which again is not the same as hamburger acted upon
by your digestive juices and assimilated into your body.2
In other words, in a debate, when a person uses language to change
the level of abstraction upon which debate occurs, that person is in
effect changing the subject matter, even if we may not realize it.
Another example may help to explain the implications of shifting
a discussion from one level to another level of abstraction. Assume
two people are discussing a movie, and they are talking about a par-
ticular scene. They describe the scene to each other and both state
that the scene was humorous. Then, one person asks why the other
person found the scene funny, and that person goes on to explain
that she enjoys physical, slapstick humor due to the way such humor
takes a surreal view of reality, which helps her to forget the routines
of everyday life. Once the discussion moves from a discussion de-
scribing a funny movie scene to a discussion about why that scene was
humorous, the discussion moves to a higher level of abstraction.
Even though they may still be referring to the same movie scene, they
are now having a substantively different conversation, because the
two discussants are no longer talking about the humorous movie
scene. Instead, they are examining their own general personal tastes
regarding humor.
Just as everyday discussions and debates shift constantly between
different levels of abstraction, 2 it follows that legal discourse shifts as
well. A critical linguistic analysis of law is an analysis that is conscious
of how courts and lawyers use linguistic techniques to subtly change
the subject matter of a legal discussion, and of how such linguistic
moves have both substantive and rhetorical effects on shaping legal
discourse.
19 Id.
20 See id. (discussing the premise that language, at each higher level of abstraction, perpetu-
ates non-identity with its initial object).
21 Id.
See, e.g., id. at 121-23 (analyzing the language structure of the statement "John is smart").
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Metalinguist Wendell Johnson provides two simple ways to deter-
mine the level of abstraction on which a discussion is operating.
First, "[a] practical test of the relative level of abstraction on which we
are speaking at any given moment lies simply in the amount of time
(or number of words) required to make reasonably clear what we are
talking about. 2 3 Second, another test of the relative abstraction of a
particular discourse is the extent to which the discourse leaves out
descriptive details.24 As discourse moves toward higher levels of gen-
erality or abstraction, more and more details are left out.
25
Thus, a critical linguistic analysis of law is an analysis which fo-
cuses on how changes in language structure and word choice can affect
the level of abstraction at which discourse occurs. Moreover, as
stated above, the structure of our language actually reflects and rein-
forces epistemological and metaphysical premises and assumptions.
A critical linguistic analysis of law, therefore, contends that scholars
should analyze the language structure of legal concepts in order to
better understand the nature of legal debates and discourse by: (1)
being conscious of the process of abstraction; (2) uncovering the un-
derlying epistemology or view of reality embedded within the lan-
guage structure of a particular doctrine; and (3) understanding how
invisible linguistic techniques can be and have been used for rhetori-
cal effect.
A third premise is that a word is functionally meaningful only to
the extent that a word or concept has a clear connection with peo-
ple's experiences.26 Under this view of language, "the meanings of
words are not in the words themselves but in the experiences behind
them."2 7 If a word fails to connect with experience, then the word is
effectively meaningless and lacks any real content.
A fourth premise is that the act of categorizing/classifying is fun-
damentally a subjective process, and that there are political, psycho-
logical, epistemological, sociological, and ideological processes un-
derlying any attempt to categorize or classify a thing or a
phenomenon. As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner assert,
"To put something in a category is to assign it a meaning, to place it
in a particular context of ideas. ,28
However, even though the act of classifying is dependent on a sub-
jective frame of reference, the abstract nature of categories or names
misleads us into believing that categories or classifications are objec-
23 Id. at 140.
24 See id. at 128 (describing the abstracting process as the process of leaving out details).
25 See id. at 128-29 (describing limits of language).
26 RAPOPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (emphasis added) (discussing the concerted effort to con-
nect man's use of language with experience).
27 Id.
28 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw 28 (2000).
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tive in nature. The reality is that someone has to classify an experience
or object as belonging to some category, and that different people
can differ as to how to classify a particular object. Thus, because of
the inherently subjective nature of classifying or naming, sociologist
Anselm Strauss contends that "[t] he way in which things are classed
together reveals, graphically as well as symbolically, the perspectives
of the classifier." Similarly, Amsterdam and Bruner assert, "catego-
rization is not only an act of reference, specifying what the thing in
question is, but also an act of sense making, specifying how the cate-
gory that includes this thing fits into our larger picture of the Shape
of Things."30
To illustrate the subjective nature of classifying or naming, Strauss
provides the example of the Laplanders, a Swedish cultural group,
who use the same word to describe both "people" and "reindeer."3'
From an "objective" point of view, a person might contend that the
Laplanders are mistaken or incorrect to call reindeer "people," since
based on objective criteria, reindeer are clearly not human beings.
However, Strauss contends that such an argument is pointless:
The life of the Laplander revolves around activities having to do with
reindeer. Is a reindeer a human or is a human a reindeer? The question
is senseless; the people and reindeer are identified, they go together, and
the very fact of their identification in terminology gives the anthropolo-
gist one of his best clues to the Laplander's ordering of the world and its
32objects.
A fifth premise is that a critical linguistic analysis presumes that
words direct action and attention.5 Words shape our intent and expecta-
tions towards certain situations and objects. As Strauss asserts, "[t] he
naming of an object provides a directive for action."3 For example, if
one were to classify a person as a "liar," then it would mean one
would be likely to treat anything uttered by that person with skepti-
cism and wariness. On the other hand, if one were to classify a per-
son as an "honest man," it would mean that one would be likely to
treat anything uttered by that person with greater trust and open-
mindedness. When we rename an object, a person, or a situation,
"[it] amounts to a reassessment of [our] relation to it, and ipso facto
[our] behavior becomes changed along the line of [our] reassess-
ment.
3 5
29 Anselm Strauss, Language and Identity, in THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY: ESSAYS AND
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73, 74 (Peter Kollock &Jodi O'Brien eds., 1994).
30 AMsTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 28, at 28-29.
31 Strauss, supra note 29, at 74.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 73 (noting that a proper discussion of action requires a discussion of linguistics).




II. A CRITICAL LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE DISCRIMINATION CONCEPT
A. From Brown I to Brown II: From Segregation to Discrimination
A critical linguistic analysis of the Court's school desegregation
decisions shows how the Court made a linguistic shift in order to slow
down the move toward actual integration of schools. In Brown J,s6 the
Court dealt with the constitutionality of the practice of state-imposed
racial segregation in public schools. In a unanimous decision, the
Court held that laws requiring or permitting racial segregation in
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.37 The landmark decision not only overruled the infa-
mous 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson caseSM-which held that state imposed ra-
cial segregation was constitutionally permissible state action-but it
also was the case that helped to catalyze the civil rights movement.
While the Brown I decision today is considered a seminal and founda-
tional equal protection decision, in 1954 the Court's intervention, on
behalf of African Americans subjected to oppressive Jim Crow racial
segregation laws, sparked enormous legal and political controversy.
The Brown I decision raised very important and difficult questions
as to its meaning and effect. Specifically, once the Court had de-
clared that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional,
the critical question was, what was the appropriate remedy for the
constitutional violation. Did Brown require states to racially integrate
the public schools in order to remedy the equal protection violation?
The question of remedy was so controversial that the Court avoided
the question of appropriate remedies in Brown ,39 deciding the rem-
edy question in an opinion handed down one year later in 1955.
Of course, whether a particular remedy is appropriate or not de-
pends on the nature of the constitutional violation. In Brown I, the
Court, in declaring that racial segregation was unconstitutional, fo-
cused its attention on the ongoing harms suffered by black children
attending racially segregated schools. 4' The Court began its opinion
by noting that four cases from different states were consolidated on
appeal. The Court then stated the relief sought by the plaintiffs in
each of the cases: "[M]inors of the Negro race, through their legal
representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 Id, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ('No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.").
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
s 347 U.S. at 495 (subordinating the question of appropriate relief due to "the wide appli-
cability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions")
40 Brown 11, 349 U.S. 249 (1955)
4 347 U.S. at 493-96 (discussing the far-reaching harmful effects of segregation on black
schoolchildren).
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the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.,
42
In seeking admission to schools on a nonsegregated basis, the plain-
tiffs alleged that laws "requiring or permitting segregation according
to race" deprived them of equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
4
The hurdle for the plaintiffs was the Court's decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson,44 which upheld state racial segregation laws as long as they
provided for "separate but equal" treatment of the races. Thus, un-
der the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine, racially segregated
schools were considered constitutional, as long as physical facilities
and other tangible factors were equal for both white and black
schools. In Brown I, however, the Court rejected the application of
the Plessy doctrine, stating that
there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have
been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curric-
ula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors.
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on 'merely a comparison of these
tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the
cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public
education .45
The rest of the Court's decision was then devoted to examining
the harmful effects of racial segregation on black schoolchildren.
Specifically, the Court linked the effects of racial segregation to the
issue of quality education: "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities?0 6 The Court
then answered its own question in the affirmative: "We believe that it
does."47 The Court emphasized the stigmatic and psychological
harms of racial segregation. It quoted a lower court's discussion of
the detrimental effect of segregation on black schoolchildren, and
then, in a famous passage from its decision, the Court asserted that
"[t] o separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."4 8 Based on its analysis of
the severe harms that racial segregation inflicted on black school-
children, the Court concluded that "in the field of public education
42 Id. at 487.
43 Id. at 488.
44 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45 347 U.S. at 492.
4 Id. at 493.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 494.
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the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal, 45 and, therefore, "segregation
is a denial of equal protection of the laws.""
While Brown I declared that segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court deliberately left open the question of
the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation.5 ' Thus, even
after Brown I was decided, the question that still remained was
whether school districts were required to immediately racially inte-
grate the public schools. That issue was left for the Court to decide
one year later in Brown II,52 the implementation decision.
The Brown II decision is most famous for its language about "all
deliberate speed."53  In that decision, the Court held that public
schools need not immediately comply with the mandate of Brown I,
but that school districts must take "all deliberate speed" in meeting
the mandate of Brown L54 The language of "all deliberate speed" has
been criticized as justifying and providing a legal basis for school dis-
tricts to delay the move towards actual racial integration of the
schools.5 5 After Brown II, school desegregation stalled and it was not
until the late 1960s that the federal district courts began to order ac-
tual integration of public schools.
What legal scholars have tended to overlook, however, is another
curious linguistic aspect of the Brown II decision. In this case, the
Court re-characterized the harms of racial segregation by talking, not
about the harms of racial segregation and the need for integrated
schools, but about the harms of racial discrimination and the need for
nondiscriminatory schools.
The Court never mentioned the terms "segregation" or "separate"
in the brief text of its decision in Brown II. Chief Justice Warren be-
gan his opinion by restating the principal holding of Brown L His
opinion stated that Brown Istands for "the fundamental principle that
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional."5  A few
sentences later, the Court again stated that Brown I was a case about
racial discrimination, not about racial segregation: "In view of the
nationwide importance of [Brown 1], we invited the Attorney General
49 Id. at 495.
50 Id.
51 See id. (declaring segregation unconstitutional).
52 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
53 Id. at 301.
54 Id.
55 See Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 554 (1995) (arguing
that the language of "with all deliberate speed" was interpreted by lower federal courts to per-
mit "integration that went not too far, not too fast, and that left the school system as intact as
possible").
56 349 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added).
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of the United States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring
or permitting racial discrimination in 7public education to present their
views on [the] question [of reliefi."'
The question that immediately arises is whether there is any sig-
nificance in the change in terms. Was the Court, in re-characterizing
racial "segregation" as racial "discrimination," merely making cos-
metic changes to its decision? While that question will be addressed
later in this Essay, what is absolutely clear is that the change in terms
mattered to the Court, as the Court in its opinion continued to con-
ceptualize the issue of remedy in terms of the word "discrimination,"
not "segregation." Specifically, after having stated that the issue in
Brown I concerned racial "discrimination," the Court in Brown II
then discussed the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs in
these terms. In this case, the Court asserted, "[a]t stake is the per-
sonal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."59 This statement is fasci-
nating because Brown I contained a virtually identical statement-
identical except for one word. Brown I had stated that the plaintiffs
sought admission to public schools on a "nonsegregated basis."
The Brown II Court continued to discuss the appropriate remedy
using the term "nondiscrimination" throughout the remainder of its
opinion. The Court held that the cases were to be remanded back to
the federal district courts for a determination of whether school dis-
tricts had taken good faith action to implement the mandate of Brown
.61 It asserted that federal district courts should be guided by equita-
ble principles in determining whether school districts were ade-
quately "effectuat[ing] a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory
school system." 62 The Court then concluded that "the cases are re-
manded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter
such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.
6
1
In Brown II, a case asserting the appropriate remedy for school
segregation, the Court managed to go through the entire opinion
without ever mentioning the word "segregation" itself.
57 Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
58 Id.
Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954) (emphasis added).
61 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299 (listing states from which cases to be remanded originated).




B. Implications of the Move from Segregation to Discrimination
This Section will examine the implications of the Court's linguistic
move from Brown I to Brown II. It contends that the linguistic move
from "segregation" to "discrimination" was a strategic move in an at-
tempt to deliberately slow down the actual integration of public
schools.
The Brown decisions have engendered voluminous scholarship at-
tempting to discern their meanings. Scholarly articles on Brown I
have focused their analyses on the Court's evaluation of the harms of
racial segregation in public schools," while scholarly articles on Brown
II have focused their analyses on the meaning of the "with all deliber-
ate speed"65 language used in that case.66 Curiously, however, only a
few articles have focused their analyses on the Court's linguistic move
from "segregation" to "discrimination" in Brown 11.67
1. Contesting the Meaning of Brown I
This Section asserts that the move from "segregation" to "dis-
crimination" rendered the meaning of Brown I contested and am-
biguous, and in conjunction with the language regarding "with all de-
liberate speed," the linguistic shift was a move to justify the Court's
decision to permit gradual and incremental, rather than immediate,
school desegregation. In short, the linguistic shift served to justify
and rationalize efforts to slow down the actual integration of schools.
To understand the strategic implications of the linguistic shift, it is
necessary to go back to the language and reasoning of the Brown I
decision. In that case, the Court emphasized that black schoolchil-
dren were being irreparably harmed by the practice of school segre-
gation. 68 Specifically, the Court contended that the systemic practice
of separating black children from white children in schools gener-
ated in black children "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
64 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132
U. PA. L. REv. 1041, 1043 (1984) ("Whatever the Supreme Court's original rationale, the
Court's conclusion in Brown I-that racially separate schooling is inherently unequal-is correct
because segregation imposes a system of unfair governance on minority students and parents.").
65 349 U.S. at 301.
66 See, e.g., Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 450, 458 (1964)
(arguing that the "deliberate speed" language "left open the possibility that the plaintiffs them-
selves would be denied any relief ... if only steps were taken to protect other Negroes-at some
later date-from similar harm").
67 See, e.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSONJR., DESEGREGATION AND THE
LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 150-53 (1957) (noting
that the word "segregation" is not present in Brown II even though "one would have expected to
have found [it] repeated many times").
See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting feelings of inferiority engendered by separa-
tion of black children from white).
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community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."6 9 Moreover, the Court quoted a passage from a
lower court decision that discussed the ways in which racial segrega-
tion has a "tendency to (retard) the educational and mental devel-
opment of negro children and to deprive them of some of the bene-
fits they would receive in a racial (ly) integrated school system."7°
Given the Court's emphasis on the continuing and irreparable
harms that racial segregation inflicted upon black schoolchildren in
Brown I, the Court was faced with a dilemma in Brown I. In Brown II,
the Court had to give guidance to federal district courts on how to
fashion proper remedies for school segregation, and the question was
whether the Court was going to require school districts to act affirma-
tively to racially integrate the public schools. The Court's decision in
Brown II suggests that it wanted to signal to the federal district courts
that they should act with caution and flexibility in fashioning appro-
priate remedies for school segregation. The decision to insert the
language regarding "with all deliberate speed" was a clear signal to
the lower courts that the Court did not require them to order the
immediate and full-scale integration of public schools.7
Directly ordering the slow-down of school desegregation would
have seemed strikingly at odds with the concerns the Court raised in
Brown I about the devastating harms being caused by racial segrega-
tion. According to the Court's own reasoning in Brown I, every day
that black children were forced to continue attending segregated
schools, they were suffering from psychological and cognitive dam-12
age. The way the Court described the harm in Brown I suggested
that the only logical remedy for school se,-egation was court orders
that the schools be integrated immediately. 3
In order to side-step this dilemma, the Brown II Court completely
omitted the word "segregation," and re-characterized the harm in
Brown I as "discrimination." Substituting the term "discrimination,"
and variations on that term, for the term "segregation" meant that
the Court in Brown II, when it needed to discuss remedies, could do
so without ever having to use the politically incendiary word integra-
tion. Obviously, if the harm is segregation, then the logical remedy is
integration. However, if the harm of separating children on the basis
of race and requiring them to attend different schools is described as
"discrimination," not "segregation," then what is the logical remedy?
69 Id.
70 Id. (alteration in original).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing the implications of the "with all de-
liberate speed" language).
7 347 U.S. at 494.
73 See id. at 494-95 (describing the severe and lasting harms of segregated schools, and con-
cluding that segregation is unconstitutional).
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The logical remedy is no longer integration. Rather, as the Court in
Brown II asserted, the remedy for discrimination becomes the crea-
tion of a "racially nondiscriminatory school system.
74
The question arises: what exactly is a nondiscriminatory school
system? In giving federal district courts the directive to guide school
districts in effectuating a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory
school system, the Court gave very little guidance as to the concrete
meanings of the terms "racial discrimination" and "racial nondis-
crimination.
2. An Early Interpretation of the Court's Linguistic Move
from Segregation to Discrimination
Even though the Court made a dramatic change in language be-
tween the two Brown decisions, curiously, there has been little schol-
arly discussion about the meaning and implications of the Court's lin-
guistic shift. Professors Albert Blaustein and Clarence Ferguson
briefly examined the linguistic move in 1957.76 In their opinion, the
shift from "segregation" to "discrimination" was a move that gave
greater analytic force to the Court's decision to declare racial segre-
gation unconstitutional." They noted:
Strangely absent from the implementation opinion is a word which
one would have expected to have found repeated many times. True, it
makes two appearances in the footnotes-but those footnotes are merely
restatements of questions 4 and 5, originally propounded two years ear-
lier. The word is not conspicuous by its absence. Lawyers have just as-
sumed it was there. And absence cannot be attributed to an error of
omission; on the contrary, it was undoubtedly difficult to write the opin-
ion without using that word. The word is "segregation."
Nor did the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Warren employ any
verb, noun, or adjective form of the word by way of substitute. There is
no "segregate," "segregated," "segregating" or "segregative." "Desegre-
gate" and "desegregation" are also absent.
The authors note that the Brown II Court, instead of using the
term "segregation," used "a much stronger word in the word dis-
crimination. Five times it was repeated; and on three occasions the
Supreme Court said that public schools should be 'nondiscrimina-
tory."'7 9 Thus, Blaustein and Ferguson argue that using the word
74 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (emphasis added).
75 See infra Part II.B.4.
76 See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 67, at 150-53 (noting the importance of the
Court's word choice).
77 Id. at 153.
78 Id. at 100.
7 Id.
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"discrimination" instead of "segregation" helped to strengthen the
Court's reasoning for striking down racial segregation in public
schools.80 They contend that the Court used the term "discrimina-
tion" in Brown II in order to invoke prior Court decisions that invali-
dated legislation motivated out of racial prejudice and bias against
racial minorities.8 ' Thus, earlier Supreme Court cases such as Kore-
matsu v. United States82 and Takahashi v. Fish Commission" stand for the
sound and fundamental constitutional proposition that discrimina-
tion against racial minorities is "unconstitutional per se. ' 4
Blaustein and Ferguson argue that the change in terms was not
done merely for aesthetic or "literary purposes," but was, in fact, a
move with a substantive purpose and substantive implications.8 5 They
argue that through its linguistic move, the Court was in effect chang-
ing the rationale for the Brown I decision. Instead of basing the con-
stitutional violation on the theory that racial segregation in public
schools inflicts stigmatic harm to black schoolchildren, the shift to
the term "discrimination" to describe this harm allowed the Court to
contend that racial segregation is unconstitutional because laws re-
quiring and enforcing it were "activated by bias and prejudice, and
thus for that reason alone... violat[ive of] the Constitution." 6
3. Professor Reva Siegel's Historical Analysis of the Post-Brown
School Desegregation Debate
Professor Reva Siegel's recent analysis, examining the historical
discourse surrounding the desegregation decisions, sup ports
Blaustein and Ferguson's linguistic analysis of the Brown cases. °" She
notes that immediately after the Brown I decision, the opinion was
strongly criticized for the way it relied on social science to justify its
holding. 88 According to Siegel, the specific target of the attack was
the Brown I decision's famous "Footnote Eleven," 9 in which the Court
80 See id. at 151-53 (noting the "legal significance" of word choice).
81 See id. at 151 (noting that the Court "has consistently struck down 'discriminatory' legisla-
tion as invalid").
82 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
83 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
84 BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 67, at 153.
85 Id. at 152-53.
86 Id. at 153.
87 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitu-
tional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (discussing "how convictions about
the principle on which Brown rests were forged in conflicts over enforcing Brown, and demon-
strates how such conflicts have produced indirection and contradiction in doctrines that en-
force the equal protection guarantee").
88 Id. at 1479-80.
89 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954).
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cited social science evidence as proof of the harms of racial segrega-
tion on black schoolchildren.9 Critics of the Brown decision deri-
sively called the Court the "nine sociologists" and argued that the
Court's use of social science evidence was "indeterminate and partial,
and hence an illegitimate ground for a decision that claimed the au-
thority of constitutional law."9'
To counter such criticism, scholars sought to provide what they
believed was a more principled rationale to justify the Brown deci-
sion. 2 Such scholars tried to reinterpret Brown I as a decision stand-
ing for the legal principle that laws drawing distinctions based on
race are "inherently arbitrary classifications," and for that reason are
unconstitutional. Under this anti-classification principle, racial seg-
regation violates the Equal Protection Clause because it arbitrarily
classifies children on the basis of race, not because it inflicts stigmatic
harm on black schoolchildren. The psychological effects of racial
segregation may have been real, but they are irrelevant for determin-
ing the constitutionality of the practice of racial segregation.94
The problem with the reinterpretation of Brown Iaccording to the
anti-classification principle is that the language and reasoning of the
decision simply do not strongly support that interpretation. As Pro-
fessor Siegel notes, the Brown I decision conspicuously lacked any
clear statement "condemn[ing] racial classification as such; rather, it
addressed the harmful consequences of separating school children in
a specific institutional context."95 The Court in Brown I did not men-
tion the harms of classification or even of discrimination. It focused
primarily on the way in which racial segregation inflicted psychologi-
cal damage on black schoolchildren.
While the language and reasoning of Brown I do not support the
anti-classification interpretation of Brown, the language of Brown II
does lend support for viewing the harm of school segregation in
terms of the anti-classification principle. Once the Court framed the
constitutional harm in terms of discrimination, rather than the harm-
ful effects of segregation, it provided scholars and lawyers with a doc-
trinal tool to argue that Brown I really stands for the principle that
90 See Siegel, supra note 87, at 1486 ("Southerners singled out for special fury the social sci-
ence evidence of segregation's harm in the decision's much-maligned Footnote Eleven.").
91 Id. at 1488.
92 See id. at 1497-99 (noting efforts to shift "attention from social struggle over the kinds of
injury to which equal protection doctrine ought to be responsive").
93 Id. at 1498 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REV. 564, 591 (1965)).
94 See id. at 1498-99 (noting opinions finding racial classifications to be invidious, and un-
constitutional solely for that reason).
95 Id. at 1481.
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classification on the basis of race constitutes the central harm that is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
4. Discrimination as an Essentially Contested Concept
In stating that the remedy required by Brown I was the implemen-
tation of racially nondiscriminatory schools, the Court in Brown II
used a linguistic shift to open up and render contestable the question
of the appropriate remedy for segregation. The terms "segregation"
and "discrimination" do not have the same meaning, although the
terms can and are sometimes used interchangeably.96
To better understand why the move from "segregation" to "dis-
crimination" helped to confuse the meaning of Brown, it is necessary
to understand the linguistic implications of the shift in terminology.
First, the terms "discrimination" and "nondiscrimination" are higher
level abstractions than the terms "segregation" and "integration." As
higher level abstractions, the meaning of the terms are far less clear.
In comparing the terms "integration" and "nondiscrimination," the
term "integration" is one that has a meaning much less contestable
than the term "nondiscrimination." While it is relatively clear what
an integrated school system would look like, it is not at all clear ex-
actly what a racially nondiscriminatory school system would look like.
The term "nondiscrimination" could be interpreted to mean the
same thing as "integration," but it does not have to be interpreted in
that way.
The abstract and general quality of the term "discrimination" has
led to fierce debates about its true meaning. The term "discrimina-
tion" is frequently used in legal and political discourse about racial
equality, but there is little consensus regarding the operational mean-
ing of the term. As Professor Rutherglen contends,
"[d]iscrimination is an inherently 'contested concept' whose mean-
ing cannot be exhausted simply by dictionary definitions or argu-
ments based on common usage. " °°
In shifting school desegregation discourse from a discourse on the
harms of segregation to the harms of discrimination, the Court
96 See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (referring to
system of racially segregated schools as a form of racial discrimination).
97 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 7, at 140 ("A practical test of the relative level of abstraction on
which we are speaking at any given moment lies simply in the amount of time (or number of
words) required to make reasonably clear what we are talking about in terms of first-order
facts.").
98 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Discrimination and its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117, 127
(1995) ("The concept of discrimination has been both oddly neglected and pervasively involved
in disputes over the meaning and application of the laws against employment discrimination.").




opened up a linguistic Pandora's box in terms of creating fierce de-
bate over the "true" meaning of Brown and the Equal Protection
Clause. The debate over the course of school desegregation can be
viewed as a fight over the meaning of the critical term "discrimina-
tion." The next Section will examine how the courts have conse-
quently interpreted the term "discrimination" in the context of
school desegregation.
C. The Shifting Meaning of Discrimination
in Equal Protection Jurisprudence
This Section will examine two important school desegregation de-
cisions that interpret the meaning of "discrimination" in Brown IL
The federal district court in Briggs v. Elliott °' interpreted the term
"discrimination" narrowly as a way to legally justify southern resis-
tance to the integration of public schools. Over a decade later, in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,0 2 the Supreme Court
interpreted the term "discrimination" broadly, as a justification for
imposing an affirmative duty on school districts to racially integrate
public schools.
1. Briggs v. Elliott and the Narrow Definition of Discrimination
Following the Brown II decision, the District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina in Briggs v. Elliot articulated a very narrow
and restrictive reading of the Brown !and Brown H cases.'°3 Briggs de-
veloped what has become known as the "Parker Doctrine," named af-
ter the federal district court judge who authored the Briggs opinion,
which stood for the proposition that Brown did not require public
schools to be racially integrated, but only prohibited school districts
from engaging in intentional discrimination in the school admissions
process. r 4 Judge Parker explained:
[I] t is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme Court has
decided and what it has not decided in this case. It has not decided that
the federal courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of the
states. It has not decided that the states must mix persons of different
races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or must de-
prive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has
decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person on
101 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
102 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
103 See 132 F. Supp. at 777 ("What [Brown] has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a
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account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains... Nothing in
the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from
the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution,
in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It
does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary ac-
tion . 5
In the above passage, the Briggs court interpreted the term "dis-
crimination" to refer solely to government decision-making in which
race is taken into account. Understanding discrimination as focused
on governmental decision-making helps to explain the Briggs court's
distinction between integration and discrimination. According to
Briggs, all that Brown I and Brown II stand for is the proposition that
the government may not discriminate on the basis of race in making1 • • 106
decisions about school admissions. On the other hand, the Briggs
court contended that Brown I and Brown II say nothing about "segre-
gation as occurs as the result of voluntary action., 10 7 In other words,
the Briggs court contended that schools separated on the basis of race
are not in violation of Brown, as long as such segregated schooling
patterns are not the result of governmental action taking race into
account in admission decisions. Thus, the Briggs reasoning supported
the perpetuation of racially segregated schools, as long as racial sepa-
ration in schools was maintained by racially-neutral state action,
rather than by facially discriminatory segregation laws. Moreover, the
Briggs court contended that its reasoning was consistent with the rea-
soning of Brown.
The Briggs court's reasoning is not supported by the language of
Brown I, but rather by the language of Brown II. Briggs seized upon
the language of Brown II to contend that Brown I was ultimately con-
cerned about discrimination, not segregation or integration.10  The
Briggs court defined the term discrimination to be synonymous with
the act of "deny[ing] to any person on account of race the right to at-
tend any school that it maintains." 1°9 The court conceptually sepa-
rated the act of discrimination-the act of admitting schoolchildren
to schools on the basis of race-from the racial segregation resulting
from that discrimination. In so doing, the court effectively treated dis-
crimination and segregation as two separate and distinct phenomena.
It would have been much more difficult for the Briggs court to
contend that Brown forbids only discrimination, and does not require
105 Id. (emphases added).
106 See id. ("[I]f the schools which [the state] maintains are open to children of all races, no
violation of the Constitution is involved ....").
107 Id.





integration, if the court had to rely solely on the language and rea-
soning of Brown I. In Brown I, the Court emphasized the harms of ra-
cial segregation on schoolchildren, strongly suggesting that the only
proper remedy for such harms was to abolish segregated schools by
integrating them.1 ° However, the shift in language from "segrega-
tion" to "discrimination" in Brown II provided the Briggs court with
the precedent necessary to interpret Brown in such a narrow fashion.
2. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
and the Broader Meaning of Discrimination
The "Parker Doctrine," along with the "all deliberate speed" lan-
guage in Brown II, had the effect of slowing down the actual integra-
tion of public schools. For ten years following the Brown II decision,
no actual integration of public schools occurred."' From 1954 to
1964, only two percent of black children in the states found to be in
violation of Brown I were attending integrated schools.12  It was not
until its 1968 decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County that the Supreme Court gave the clear and unambiguous sig-
nal that Brown I and Brown H imposed an affirmative duty on public
school districts to actually racially integrate the schools. "3
In Green, the Court examined whether freedom-of-choice plans
implemented by school districts fulfilled the mandate of Brown.'
1 4
"Freedom-of-choice" plans gave parents the right to choose which
school their children would attend."5 Many school districts adopted
freedom-of-choice plans and contended that such plans fulfilled their
responsibilities to remedy the constitutional harm recognized in
Brown 1.116 However, the problem with freedom-of-choice plans was
that their implementation did not have the effect of actual racial in-
110 See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [black children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
I See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAw 479 (3d ed., West Publish-
ing Co. 1992) (describing the "miniscule" progress in the desegregation of southern schools in
the post-Brown II decade).
112 Id.
113 See 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) ("School boards... operating state-compelled dual sys-
tems [at the time of Brown I] were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.").
"4 Id. at 431-32.
15 See id. (explaining that such a plan "allows a pupil to choose his own public school").
116 See Note, Free Choice and Free Transfer Plans for School Desegregation, 82 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112
(1968) (noting the abundance of freedom-of-choice plans in southern school districts during
the 1966-1967 school year).
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tegration of the schools. 1 7 Prior to its freedom-of-choice plan, the
New Kent County School District was a rural school district with only
two public schools: one all-white school and one all-black school.1
Three years after the school district implemented the freedom-of-
choice plan, no white children had chosen to attend the all-black
school, while only a small percentage of black students had chosen to
attend the previously all-white school."9 Eighty-five percent of black
students still chose to attend the all-black school.
2
1
In defending the freedom-of-choice plan, the New Kent County
School District made a clear and powerful argument. The language
of Brown II seemed to strongly support the argument for the school
district: its plan was in full compliance with the Brown mandate be-
cause the plan was facially race-neutral, and thus the district's plan
was clear proof that it was now admitting students to public schools
on a nondiscriminatory and nonracial basis.' 2' Therefore, if the
schools were still racially segregated, even after implementation of
the plan, that result would no longer be traceable to direct state ac-
tion, but to the private choices of both white and black parents. In
other words, even if black children were still attending an all-black
school, and white children were still attending a predominantly white
school, the argument could be made that such a school system was
nondiscriminatory because the admissions process itself operated in a
nonracial and nondiscriminatory manner. As Professor Gewirtz
commented, "Giving pupils a choice among schools seems to be nei-
ther a system of racial assignment nor a system of 'determining ad-
mission' on a racial basis; instead, it seems to permit blacks as well as
whites to choose the school they want without government interfer-
,,122
ence.
The Green Court, however, held that freedom-of-choice plans that
do not actually desegregate schools are unconstitutional and are not
in compliance with the Brown mandate.2  In striking down the free-
dom-of-choice plans, the Court re-interpreted Brown II, and re-
articulated the meaning of "discrimination," by crafting a broader,
17 See Green, 391 U.S. at 441 (stating that eighty-five percent of black children still attended
the all-black school at issue in Green, and that no white children were enrolled).
118 See id. at 432 (explaining that the district's 740 black students attended the Watkins
School, while the 550 white students attended New Kent School).
119 Only 115 black children had entered New Kent School by 1967. Id. at 441.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 437 ("The School Board contends that it has fully discharged its obligation by
adopting a plan by which every student, regardless of race, may 'freely' choose the school he
will attend.").
122 Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 728, 736 (1986).
M2 See 391 U.S. at 437-38 (stating that a dual system based upon racial discrimination, more
than a decade after Brown I, is unconstitutional).
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more systemic understanding of the term, and effectively overruling
the narrow construction of the term articulated by the Briggs court.
1 24
Justice Brennan, who authored the unanimous opinion in Green,
framed the issue using the language of Brown IL He contended that
the issue in Green was whether the "School Board's adoption of a
'freedom-of-choice' plan which allows a pupil to choose his own pub-
lic school constitutes adequate compliance with the Board's respon-
sibility 'to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a non-racial basis.""
125
In Green, Justice Brennan reasoned that the Commonwealth of
Virginia, operating through the local school board and through
school officials, "organized and operated a dual system" of schools,
"part 'white' and part 'Negro." 26 Justice Brennan then reinterpreted
the Brown I and Brown II decisions, characterizing those decisions as
concerned with the abolition of racially-segregated dual school sys-
tems: "It was such dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I held uncon-
stitutional and a year later Brown II held must be abolished; school
boards operating such school systems were required by Brown II 'to ef-
fectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system."
27
The Court gave Brown II a broader, more expansive reading than
did the Briggs court. Justice Brennan interpreted Brown II as
"call[ing] for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems," and
imposing on school districts an "affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.',
28
The language in Green is powerful. The Court, by imposing a duty
upon school districts to dismantle racial discrimination "root and
branch," clearly viewed racial discrimination as something more than
an act of classification on the basis of race. The Court forcefully as-
serted that the mere implementation of a race-neutral admissions
policy did not sufficiently address racial discrimination "root and
branch." The Court suggested that the elimination of racial dis-
crimination requires more than the adoption of facially race-neutral
policies. Rather, the Court used the term "racial discrimination" to
refer to a system of racial subordination. Throughout the opinion,
the Court repeatedly referred to the constitutional requirement of
school districts to dismantle dual school systems and to construct uni-
124 See id. at 441 (holding that school districts must actually dismantle racial segregation and
create a "unitary, nonracial system").
125 Id. at 431-32 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)).
126 Id. at 435.
127 Id. (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301) (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 437-38.
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tary school systems.129 Thus, while the Court relied on the language
of Brown II in framing its decision, in actuality, the Court added sub-
stance to that decision by fleshing out the meanings of the terms "dis-
crimination" and "nondiscrimination." A "discriminatory" school sys-
tem was one which perpetuated a dual system of schools, even if its
admissions policies were facially neutral, and a "nondiscriminatory"
school system was one which was unitary in nature and no longer
provided for racially identifiable schools.
3 °
For the Green Court, the district's freedom-of-choice plan did not
meet the mandate of Brown II because it failed to disestablish the dis-
criminatory dual system of public schools originally imposed by state
segregation statutes.'31 The implementation of race-neutral admis-
sions policy alone was not evidence of the establishment of a unitary
school system. Proof of the existence of a unitary school system
would be based on the abolition of racially identifiable schools, and
the actual creation of a unitary school system for persons of all
132races.
Furthermore, the Green decision represents a major gloss on the
original Brown I ruling. In Brown I, the Court did not discuss "well-
entrenched dual systems" or "segregated systems" of racial subordina-
tion, but rather focused on the psychological harms that segregation
inflicted upon black schoolchildren. 3 In Green, however, the Court
identified the real problem at issue in Brown L The harm of segrega-
tion was not only that it stigmatized black schoolchildren, but that it
was also used as an integral part of a larger social system of racial
apartheid, in which blacks were separated from whites in order to
perpetuate white supremacy and reinforce black inferiority.
The unfortunate aspect of the Green decision was that the Court
continued to use the language of "discrimination," as utilized in
Brown II, to describe the system of racial apartheid.1 4 This is unfor-
tunate because, while a broader conception of "discrimination" pre-
vailed in Green, that victory was temporary and fleeting. Soon after
12 See, e.g., id. at 438 ("The Constitutional rights of Negro School Children articulated in
Brown I permit no less than this [conversion to a unitary system]; and it was to this end that
Brown IIcommanded school boards to bend their efforts.").
130 See id. at 440-41 (explaining that a unitary school system is a nonracial one, whereas dual
systems are in and of themselves, unacceptable systems based upon segregation).
See id. at 441-42 ("Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has
operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility, which Brown II
placed squarely on the School Board.").
12 See id. at 439 (stating that the school board's burden is to create a program that will realis-
tically work to disestablish the dual system).
133 See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (Brown 1) (stating that the separation of children due to "race
generates a feeling of inferiority").
t The Green Court followed the Brown H Court's use of the term "discrimination," rather
than use the language of "segregation." See Green, 391 U.S. at 430.
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Green was decided, the Court began to scale back the protections pro-
vided by the Equal Protection Clause, and reasserted the narrow
Briggs definition of "discrimination" for equal protection purposes.15
III. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
RACE JURISPRUDENCE
This Essay has examined the shifting meaning of the term "dis-
crimination" in Equal Protection Clause case law dealing with school
desegregation. This Part examines the meaning of "discrimination"
in current equal protection doctrine, and how language has helped
to shape the doctrine's substantive evolution.
A. The Concept of Discrimination in Current Equal Protection Doctrine
While an expansive definition of discrimination, as a system of ra-
cial subordination, was adopted by the Green Court, that understand-
ing of the term did not have lasting power. Instead, the Court, in
subsequent desegregation and affirmative action decisions, has re-
placed this broad definition with a much narrower conception, con-
sistent with the Briggs definition of discrimination. 16In equal protec-
tion doctrine, the term "discrimination" has come to be synonymous
with the process of differentiation. 7 Accordingly, Brown effectively
stands for the fundamental proposition that "government may not
classify on the basis of race," but it no longer stands for the proposi-
tion that government may not engage in racial subordination.
The Court's doctrinal move toward an anti-classification under-
standing of Brown, as it relates to equal protection, occurred gradu-
ally in several different areas of equal protection doctrine. In the
context of school desegregation, following the Green decision, the
Court made a distinction between de jure racial segregation in
schools and de facto racial segregation in schools, holding that only
de jure segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. r 9 De jure
segregation is segregation determined to have been caused by racially
discriminatory state action, whereas de facto segregation is segrega-
135 See infra Part III.A (discussing in detail the school desegregation cases subsequent to
Green).
13 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05 (explaining that Briggs did not require integra-
tion, but merely prohibited intentional discrimination by school districts in their admissions
processes).
137 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) ("[T]he anti-differentiation perspective focuses on the specific effect of
the alleged discrimination on discrete individuals, rather than on groups.").
138 SIEGEL, supra note 87, at 1470.
139 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding that de jure segregation
indicates the purpose or intent to segregate).
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tion that cannot be traced to racially discriminatory state action. 14 0 To
put it another way, de jure segregation is considered a "discrimina-
tory" form of segregation, while de facto segregation is considered a
"nondiscriminatory" form of segregation. A de jure segregated
school system, therefore, is a system that segregates its students on
the basis of racial classifications.
4
1
As a general principle, the Court also adopted a narrow definition
of the term "discrimination" as the essential concept at the heart of
what the Equal Protection Clause condemns and prohibits. In Wash-
ington v. Davis, the Court declared, "The central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. 14  The Court
held that facially neutral laws that have a disproportionate impact on
certain racial groups do not violate equal protection, unless it can be
shown that the law was enacted with a racially discriminatory pur-
143pose. In effect, Davis overruled Green because the narrow concep-
tion of "discrimination" it adopted is substantively different from the
broader conception of discrimination found to be violative of equal
protection in Green.
The narrow Briggs definition of discrimination, confining its
meaning to intentional discrimination in school admissions, is also
central to understanding the Court's affirmative action decisions un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.144 The Court has held that race-
conscious affirmative action programs, designed to aid underrepre-
sented racial groups in acquiring equal educational and employment
opportunities are constitutionally suspect and subject to the most rig-
orous judicial scrutiny. 145 The Court believes that such affirmative ac-
tion programs, even though "benign," are racially discriminatory in
nature. Specifically, the Court declared that affirmative action pro-
140 Id.
141 See id. at 207 (referring to the need to find "a racially discriminatory purpose").
142 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
143 Id. at 240-41.
144 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (allowing the use of race as a "fac-
tor in the context of individualized consideration," so long as non-minority applicants are not
unduly harmed); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995) (holding that
benign racial classification is permissible only if it survives strict scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989) (holding that a racial quota program for contractors is not a
narrowly tailored method for remedying past discrimination); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (holding that race may be used as a factor in admissions considera-
tions, but that all applicants must still compete with other applicants as individuals in the proc-
ess).
145 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that all classifications based on race must be exam-
ined under the highest scrutiny and can only be upheld if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling government interests).
146 See id. at 226 (holding that "benign" racial classifications must be held to the same stan-
dard of strict scrutiny applied to other racial classifications).
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grams are presumptively unconstitutional because they classify on the
basis of race in order to give preferential treatment to members of
underrepresented racial groups.'47
Again, the Court, in its affirmative action decisions, has narrowly
defined "discrimination" solely as the act of classification on the basis
of race." For the Court, it is irrelevant that affirmative action pro-
grams use racial classifications to promote equal opportunity and to
racially integrate institutions of public education or industry. In-
stead, the simple fact that affirmative action programs classify on the
basis of race render them constitutionally suspect. The Court is effec-
tively asserting that affirmative action amounts to the same type of
practice as Jim Crow segregation, at least for purposes of an equal
protection analysis.' 49
Equal protection doctrine has developed from the more complex,
systemic understanding of discrimination in Green,150 to the current
equal protection doctrine in which discrimination is understood
solely in terms of classifications. In other words, under current equal
protection doctrine, racial classification is considered inherently arbi-
trary and invidious, regardless of its purposes or effects. Moreover,
the Court now suggests that the mere act of classifying on the basis of
race gives rise to a constitutional injury, even if a party cannot show
any material harm or disadvantage resulting from the classification. 5
Thus, in Adarand, the Court asserted that simply classifying on the ba-
sis of race alone constitutes a constitutional injury.'
B. Understanding How Language Has Shaped Equal Protection Doctrine
Presently, the Court's narrow understanding of "discrimination"
has effectively limited the ability of the Equal Protection Clause to
adequately address issues of systemic racial inequality and subordina-
tion. The questions arise: How did we get to this point? How did the
Court shift from the equal protection doctrine of 1954, focused on
147 Id. at 227.
148 See id. at 229-30 ("[W] henever the government treats any person unequally because of his
or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.").
149 See Adarand 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no difference
between a majority group's decision to impose a burden on a minority group and a decision to
impose a benefit on a minority group).
150 See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the Green case and its broad interpretation of "discrimina-
tion").
1 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 ("Consistency does recognize that any individual suffers an
injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever
that race may be.").
152 Id.
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remedying the devastating harms of racial segregation upon blacks, 15 3
to an equal protection doctrine in 2004 that is focused on remedying
the inherently harmful effects that racial classifications supposedly in-
flict on whites? Why did the definition of discrimination as classifica-
tion come to so thoroughly pervade our understanding of equal pro-
tection doctrine? And, why did the definition of discrimination as a
system of racial subordination fail to remain as the central concept of
equal protection doctrine?
A linguistic analysis of the term "discrimination" may help to shed
some light on the substantive development of equal protection doc-
trine. Although the analysis I will put forth is tentative and prelimi-
nary, it may explain how the structure of language itself shapes and
influences the substantive meaning of legal doctrine.
First, it is necessary to discuss the linguistic structure of the term
"discrimination." The term "discrimination" is what linguists call a
nominalization., 54 A nominalization is defined as a base verb (dis-
criminate) that has been turned into a noun (discrimination),
thereby transforming a process into an event or a thing.155 To talk of
"discrimination," then, is a way of talking about the process of dis-
criminating as if it were a tangible thing or a discrete event. As a
"thing," we can talk about "discrimination" as though it either exists or
does not exist, as if it is something we can observe with our senses. As a
discrete event, we may discuss "discrimination" as though it either
happened or did not happen.
An examination of case law and scholarly works discussing dis-
crimination would show that analyses of "discrimination" tend to dis-
cuss the term in its nominalized form. 56 In other words, lawyers and
law professors implicitly treat "discrimination" as if the word repre-
sents a discrete event. In trying to determine the essential meaning
of the term, the term "discrimination" has had scholars asking the fol-
lowing question: If discrimination is a discrete event, what kind of
event is it?
The problem, however, with the search for the essential meaning
of the term "discrimination" is that the term is highly abstract, and,
accordingly, does not have clear and unambiguous external refer-
153 See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (holding that segregation in schools generated a
feeling of inferiority among blacks and had to be dismantled under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
154 See BANDLER & GRINDER, supra note 7, at 43 (explaining that nominalization is a linguistic
mechanism for "turning a process into an event").
155 See id. at 32 (explaining that nominalization results when a verb becomes a noun or an
argument).
1 See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365 (2003)
(discussing discrimination in its nominalized form); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (same).
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ents."" To say that a word does not have clear external referents,
then, is to say that the term "discrimination" does not really describe
a real life event or situation.
To further explain the abstract quality of the term "discrimina-
tion," it may be useful to compare the term to "segregation." The
term "segregation" is also a nominalization because it has resulted
from a transformation of a base verb (segregate) to a noun. How-
ever, "segregation" operates at a lower level of abstraction than the
term "discrimination." While the term "discrimination" is used to re-
fer to a discrete event, the term "segregation" is used to refer to an
actual thing. More specifically, "segregation" refers to a condition.
For example, "segregation" may be described as the condition of
people being physically separated according to their race. As a lower
level abstraction, the term "segregation" has much clearer external
referents. In other words, when we talk about segregation in public
schools, people are likely to have a much clearer understanding of
the condition being represented by the term than if we were to dis-
cuss discrimination in schools.
In order to show that external referents for the term "discrimina-
tion" are less clear than referents for the term "segregation," a simple
question may be asked: How does one go about proving the exis-
tence of racially segregated schools? The easiest way is to make an em-
pirical observation by actually visiting schools to see if they are physi-
cally divided between the races. Regardless of the distinction
between de jure or de facto segregation, the starting point for deter-
mining whether a school is racially segregated is both clear and obvi-
ous. Therefore, a clear external referent of the term "segregation"
would be the actual physical existence of schools that are divided be-
tween the races.
On the other hand, how does one go about proving the existence
of racially discriminatory schools? As the earlier discussion showed,
whether a school is racially discriminatory depends upon how one de-
fines the term "discrimination.''58 And, even when the term is de-
fined, what exactly counts as proof of racial discrimination remains
unclear. For example, if one interprets "racially discriminatory" to
mean schools in which students are admitted on the basis of their
race, then proof of racial discrimination will necessarily turn to an
examination of the admissions process. Or, if schools are segregated
under state law, then the issue of proof is even more straightforward;
157 An external referent is "the object or situation in the real world to which the word or label
refers." STUART CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS 9 (1938).
1 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of pairing the term
"discrimination" with external referents).
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the segregation laws themselves would provide proof of a racially dis-
criminatory school system.
59
However, if schools use facially neutral policies to discriminate,
then it becomes less clear what sort of evidence constitutes proof that
such schools are actually engaging in discrimination. For example,
assume that a school disciplines a black student, and the student al-
leges that he was singled out according to a covert school disciplinary
policy of racial discrimination against black students. How does one
know if, in fact, the school operated in a racially discriminatory man-
ner in disciplining the black student? What would constitute proof of
discrimination? The mere act of a black student being disciplined
does not prove discrimination since there may have been other le-
gitimate reasons besides race for the action. Thus, the question
arises: what distinguishes racially discriminatory discipline from ra-
cially nondiscriminatory discipline?
According to current equal protection case law, a showing of dis-
criminatory intent would prove that the school engaged in racial dis-
crimination.' 6° But, what counts as proof of discriminatory intent?
Would racially prejudicial statements made by a school principal to
his or her colleagues constitute proof of discriminatory intent?
Would a previous history of the principal disciplining black students
qualify? What about the quality of a principal's justification for the
discipline? Would a weak rationale prove that the nondiscriminatory
reason was mere pretext for his or her actual racially discriminatory
intent? As the Court has recognized, the search for discriminatory
intent is difficult because many actions could be used as proof of dis-
crimination. 16' Since it is not clear what is meant by "discrimination,"
just about any action could demonstrate that discrimination had, in
fact, occurred. Hence, scholars contend that discrimination is an es-
sentially contested concept.
62
159 Even situations in which laws that require schools to racially discriminate, such does not
necessarily provide clear proof of racial discrimination. For example, imagine a school district
which refuses to comply with racial segregation laws, and instead sets policies to ensure that
students of all races attend the same schools. In such a scenario, is that school district a racially
discriminatory school system or a racially nondiscriminatory school system? It is racially dis-
criminatory if the definition applied looks solely to the segregation law itself as proof of dis-
crimination. However, if one's definition of racial discrimination looks also to the school's ac-
tual practices, then it could be argued that the school system is racially nondiscriminatory,
despite operating under a regime of state-imposed racial discrimination.
160 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("The school desegregation cases have
also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
161 See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1075-76 (1998) (arguing
that evidentiary requirements for proving discriminatory intent under equal protection law vary
widely in different contexts).
162 See Rutherglen, supra note 98, at 127 (explaining that discrimination's meaning "cannot
be exhausted simply by dictionary definitions or arguments based on common usage").
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Given that the term "discrimination" is substantively empty, and
given that its meaning depends on subjective interpretation, it is ripe
for people to pour their own subjective meanings into it in order to
give it content. Thus, whether a term's meaning achieves a consensus
at a given historical moment depends upon the epistemological and
ideological commitments possessed by those who seek to give it a
meaning.
In addition, use of the term "discrimination" not only reflects cer-
tain ideological commitments, but it also reinforces those commit-
ments. Words have the effect of directing our attention and focus.
63
The use of the term "discrimination" directs our attention toward is-
sues of intent, causation, and motivation. In other words, to deter-
mine if a government actor has covertly classified on the basis of race,
an inquiry into the intent of that government actor is typically re-
quired. The word "discrimination" has accordingly directed the en-
ergy of both courts and scholars, as each seeks to construct analytic
and evidentiary frameworks for determining whether a party has
proven that the government acted with the requisite intent. 6 When
a "discriminatory" act allegedly occurred in the past, scholars and
courts have had to determine whether a past act of discrimination
could be considered the proximate cause of a present-day discrimina-
tory effect.
6 5
However, given the enormous amount of attention in racial dis-
course paid to issues such as discriminatory intent, motivation, and
causation, the concrete material facts of present-day racial subordina-
tion and inequality are easily forgotten or ignored.166 By directing our
attention towards metaphysical issues of intent, rather than focusing
on evidence of continuing racial inequality, it becomes much easier
to believe that racial inequality is all but a thing of the past. Our use
of language can actually help to render, in our minds, actual condi-
tions of material reality virtually invisible and non-existent. It is strik-
1t See Strauss, supra note 29, at 75 ("The naming of an object provides a directive for action,
as if the object were forthrightly to announce, 'You say I am this, then act in the appropriate
way toward me.'").
1 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (creat-
ing an analytic framework to ascertain whether a facially neutral law was enacted with racially
discriminatory purpose); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 935, 938 (1989) (arguing that the discriminatory intent standard is vague and indeter-
minate, and should not be "rigorously applied").
1n5 See Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARv. L. REv. 828 (1983) (stating
that the Supreme Court has had to grapple with the enduring effects of past discrimination).
166 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (explaining that the word
.segregation" has disappeared from our discourse about residential separation by race in Amer-
ica).
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ing that in Grutter v. Bollinger,61 in which the Court ambivalently up-
held race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher education,
the majority opinion never mentioned the continued existence of ra-
cially segregated schools in the United States."
CONCLUSION
The use of the term "discrimination" to describe equal protection
doctrine and itsoprinciples has ultimately shaped the course of the
debate over racial segregation. The term has obscured and obfus-
cated the material reality of racial subordination in the United States.
The linguistic nature of the term has shifted our attention away from
the actual and continuing harms suffered by members of socio-
economically disadvantaged racial groups and, instead, has focused
the debate over racial equality on abstract, symbolic, and aesthetic
harms supposedly caused by governmental acts of racial classification.
Additionally, the continuing use of the term "discrimination" to de-
scribe and theorize about the harms suffered by disadvantaged racial
groups focuses our attention on issues that are unrelated to the truly
important questions about the continuing existence of racial hierar-
chy and socioeconomic inequality in this nation.
In short, the term "discrimination" provides us with a terribly mis-
leading map for understanding the new social territory of race, racial
apartheid, and racial inequality in the United States. The challenge
today is for progressive scholars and lawyers to begin developing a
more insightful and transformative language to adequately address
the continuing problem of racial subordination in the twenty-first
century.
167 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
168 Id.
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